


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3 October 1966

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INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Prepared Weekly

for the

SENIOR INTERDEPARTMENTAL GROUP

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

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
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NIGERIA



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1. NIGERIA


Nigeria's internal crisis has deepened appreciably in recent weeks. A long period of confusion seems likely before some new order emerges, and even this may only be achieved at the cost of civil war and the fragmentation of the country.

Since last July when undisciplined Northern soldiers overthrew the former Ironsi military regime and installed their man, Lt. Col. Gowon, as supreme commander, they have pursued a bloody vendetta against the hated Ibo tribesmen from Eastern Nigeria. Their depredations, which the police are not in a position to halt, have encouraged a general atmosphere of lawlessness. Last week, aroused tribal mobs in the North indulged in a new wave of large-scale violence against Ibos, over 500 of whom were killed.

There seems little chance that the Northerners will be satisfied until all of the Ibos are eliminated from the Northern scene. The departure of relatively skilled Ibos is crippling essential services throughout the region and reducing town after town to the status of a bush village.

The deteriorating security situation threatens to break up the current constitutional talks among regional representatives. As of 30 September, when the conference began a two-week recess, the delegates had made some modest, tentative progress on the allocation of powers within a new federal structure.


The question of creating new states from the present four regions (see map) is especially explosive because of the strong opposition of the Ibo regional regime to any imposed division of the East. If the Northerners finally force the issue by moving troops into the East, the Easterners would almost certainly resist with force.



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2. FRENCH SOMALILAND

The possibility of a French departure from this enclave is whetting the appetites of neighboring Ethiopia and the Somali Republic (see map). The territory has an almost equal mix of Somali and non-Somali tribes.

In mid-September Paris announced it would hold a new referendum on the issue of independence before 1 July 1967. Paris acted following nationalist disturbances in French Somaliland in late August during De Gaulle's visit, and again in mid-September. In 1958 the territory voted to remain with France, and Paris is now warning that it will cut off all aid if the Somalilanders decide to leave the nest.

Ethiopia is determined to keep the territory out of unfriendly hands because of its own dependence on the Addis Ababa - Djibouti railroad for rail access to the sea. Emperor Haile Selassie, already highly agitated over Soviet arms deliveries to his enemy, the Somali Republic, has declared that French Somaliland forms an integral part of Ethiopia. He says he will not accept any solution contrary to Ethiopian interests.

Similarly, the Somali Republic wants French Somaliland, in line with its policy of bringing all ethnic Somalis into the republic. Mogadiscio fears the area will fall under Ethiopian hegemony --perhaps with French collusion--and has declared it will fight if Ethiopia makes any military moves toward it.

In any event, relations between Ethiopia and the Somali Republic almost certainly will deteriorate further in the months before the referendum. In this atmosphere any incidents of violence along the countries' long-undefined common border could easily escalate into open warfare.

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3. SOUTH KOREA

The political turmoil over a recent smuggling scandal involving the government presages longer term political and economic difficulties for South Korea.

The scandal grew out of political infighting among the supporters of President Pak Chong-hui. Kim Chong-pil, chairman of the government party, appears to have surfaced the case in an attempt to bring down factional opponents close to Pak. The stake was control of the regime's sources of political funds. Kim also hoped to gain the upper hand in selecting the party's National Assembly candidates next spring and greater influence in the choice of a presidential candidate in 1971 when Pak will be ineligible for re-election.

Pak has moved to restore political calm by making minor cabinet changes to appease public indignation over the smuggling scandal. In addition, after pledging continued support to his inner circle, he urged its members to re-establish relations with Kim.

Although Kim's maneuver failed to force the ouster of any of his enemies, it may give him access to more political funds. Leading businessmen who had thought their connections with the President's inner circle provided security are now considering contributing to Kim for protection.

The opposition parties, provided with a good campaign issue, are raising a public howl against the big business combines on which the nation's economic growth in large part depends.

The prospect that such incidents will occur with increasing frequency threatens to become a serious deterrent to Korean economic development and consequently a hindrance to US interests

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5. GUYANA

Strong disagreement between the two leaders of the coalition threatens to cause an open split in the government of Guyana.

In recent weeks the conflict between Prime Minister Forbes Burnham and Finance Minister Peter D'Aguiar, who have distrusted each other since they formed a government in 1964, has increased. Among the points of difference are disagreement over a proposed security law, charges by D'Aguiar that Burnham is squandering funds, and a dispute over the composition of a commission to handle Amerindian affairs.

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Until now the pressure of a strong opposition led by Marxist Cheddi Jagan has held the two leaders together despite their disagreements. However, their differences are now so serious that a split could occur at any time. A falling out between Burnham and D'Aguiar would not necessarily cause a breakup of the coalition, even if D'Aguiar resigned his cabinet post, but the government's small majority in the legislature--30 of 53 seats--would be endangered by any major change in the present bi-partisan arrangement.

The friction within the coalition is encouraging Jagan and his followers to exploit the situation by increasing agitation among the general public. The next few months could thus become critical, particularly in view of the scheduled departure of the remaining British troops before 31 October.

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6. ECUADOR

Preparations for the 16 October constituent assembly election are continuing in an atmosphere of public indifference [REDACTED]

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Contrary to earlier expectations, the election probably will be held on schedule. The convening of the assembly, now scheduled for 3 November, may be delayed, however, to give the electoral tribunals time to handle complaints and demands for recounts. Interim President Yerovi is determined that the assembly meet as soon as possible so he can return the country to constitutional rule. Meanwhile, the politicians are maneuvering for position when the assembly meets.

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While Yerovi centers his attention on the convening of the assembly, the government's financial problems continue to mount. The head of Ecuador's Central Bank believes that the government is on the verge of a fiscal crisis and has given the US Embassy an extremely pessimistic opinion on prospects for the country's economy. [REDACTED]

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